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SUMMARY:Is Equal Opportunity Different from Welfarism? - Gabriel Carroll (
 University of Toronto)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250617T124500
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20250617T140000
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/acb212f7-135b-453c-9978-8626fd18b40f/
DESCRIPTION:Equal opportunity\, widely invoked in popular discourse as a g
 oal for policy\, seems at odds with the welfarist approach that is standar
 d in economics. But are they really different? We consider a canonical cla
 ss of resource allocation problems and ask whether the allocations chosen 
 by an equal-opportunity criterion could also have been chosen under some w
 elfarist criterion. Typically\, no such welfarist criterion exists. Howeve
 r\, for a rich class of problem specifications\, it does exist\, and we ch
 aracterize this class. When the welfarist criterion does exist\, it can us
 e either the sum or the min to aggregate individual welfares\; the freedom
  to use more exotic aggregators does not expand the possibilities.\nSpeake
 rs:\nGabriel Carroll (University of Toronto)
LOCATION:Nuffield College (Butler Room)\, New Road OX1 1NF
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/acb212f7-135b-453c-9978-8626fd18b40f/
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DESCRIPTION:Talk:Is Equal Opportunity Different from Welfarism? - Gabriel 
 Carroll (University of Toronto)
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SUMMARY:Gabriel Carroll: Dynamic Incentives in Incompletely Specified Envi
 ronments  - Gabriel Carroll (University of Toronto)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20211112T151500Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20211112T163000Z
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/b7ba2a68-65be-4404-92a5-27437e1c7136/
DESCRIPTION:Consider a repeated interaction where it is unknown which of v
 arious stage games will be played each period.  This framework captures th
 e logic of intertemporal incentives even though numeric payoffs to any str
 ategy profile are indeterminate.  A natural solution concept is ex post pe
 rfect equilibrium (XPE): strategies must form a subgame-perfect equilibriu
 m for any realization of the sequence of stage games.  When (i) there is o
 ne long-run player and others are short-run\, and (ii) public randomizatio
 n is available\, we can adapt the standard recursive approach to determine
  the maximum sustainable gap between reward and punishment.  This leads to
  an explicit characterization of what outcomes are supportable in equilibr
 ium\, and an optimal penal code that supports them.  Any non-XPE-supportab
 le outcome fails to be an SPE outcome for some (possibly ambiguous) specif
 ication of the stage games.  Unlike in standard repeated games\, restricti
 ons (i) and (ii) are crucial. \nSpeakers:\nGabriel Carroll (University of 
 Toronto)
LOCATION:Manor Road Building (Seminar Room A or Join online https://zoom.u
 s/j/91802954429?pwd=ZzNyeEcvL3JjN2NPVWZHVG9hcmR1UT09)\, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/b7ba2a68-65be-4404-92a5-27437e1c7136/
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DESCRIPTION:Talk:Gabriel Carroll: Dynamic Incentives in Incompletely Speci
 fied Environments  - Gabriel Carroll (University of Toronto)
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