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SUMMARY:Explanatory (A)symmetries and Humean Laws - Michael Hicks (Univers
 ity of Oxford)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20170309T163000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20170309T183000Z
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/ff010202-9980-4e73-bc68-0b3907ce8bc9/
DESCRIPTION:Recently\, Lange (2009) has argued that some physical principl
 es are explanatorily prior to others. Lange's main examples are symmetry p
 rinciples\, which he argues explain both conservation laws--through Noethe
 r's Theorem--and  features of dynamic laws--for example\, the Lorentz inva
 riance of QFT. Lange calls these "meta-laws" claims that his account of la
 ws\, which is built around the counterfactual stability of groups of state
 ments\, can capture the fact that these govern or constrain first-order la
 ws\, whereas other views\, principally Humean views\, can't. After reviewi
 ng the problem Lange presents\, I'll show how the explanatory asymmetry be
 tween laws he describes follows naturally on a Humean understanding of wha
 t laws are--particularly informative summaries. The Humean should agree wi
 th Lange that symmetry principles are explanatorily prior to both conserva
 tion laws and dynamic theories like QFT\; however\, I'll argue that Lange 
 is wrong to consider these principles "meta-laws" which in some way govern
  first-order laws\, and I'll show that on the Humean view\, the explanatio
 n of these two sorts of laws from symmetry principles is importantly diffe
 rent.\nSpeakers:\nMichael Hicks (University of Oxford)
LOCATION:Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room\, Second Floor)\, Woodstock Ro
 ad OX2 6GG
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/ff010202-9980-4e73-bc68-0b3907ce8bc9/
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DESCRIPTION:Talk:Explanatory (A)symmetries and Humean Laws - Michael Hicks
  (University of Oxford)
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SUMMARY:How ψ-ontic are ψ-ontic models? - Ronnie Hermens (University of 
 Oxford)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20170302T163000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20170302T183000Z
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/efc64326-86ad-40d1-925e-a7278f1c79ba/
DESCRIPTION:Ψ-ontology theorems show that in any ontic model that is able
  to reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics\, the quantum state mus
 t be encoded by the ontic state. Since the ontic state determines what is 
 real\, and it determines the quantum state\, the quantum state must be rea
 l. But how does this precisely work in detail\, and what does the result i
 mply for the status of the quantum state in ψ-ontic models? As a test cas
 e scenario I will look at the ontic models of Meyer\, Kent and Clifton. Si
 nce these models are able to reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanic
 s\, they must be ψ-ontic. On the other hand\, quantum states play no role
  whatsoever in the construction of these models. Thus finding out which on
 tic state belongs to which quantum state is a non-trivial task. But once t
 hat is done\, we can ask: does the quantum state play any explanatory role
  in these models\, or is the fact that they are ψ-ontic a mere mathematic
 al nicety? \nSpeakers:\nRonnie Hermens (University of Oxford)
LOCATION:Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room\, Second Floor)\, Woodstock Ro
 ad OX2 6GG
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/efc64326-86ad-40d1-925e-a7278f1c79ba/
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DESCRIPTION:Talk:How ψ-ontic are ψ-ontic models? - Ronnie Hermens (Unive
 rsity of Oxford)
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SUMMARY:How multiverses might undercut the fine-tuning argument - Alastair
  Wilson (University of Birmingham)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20170209T163000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20170209T183000Z
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/42d51725-173b-425b-ac3c-d9f17833d2d8/
DESCRIPTION:In the context of the probabilistic fine-tuning argument that 
 moves from the fragility of cosmological parameters with respect to life t
 o the existence of a divine designer\, appealing to the existence of a mul
 tiverse has in general seemed problematically ad hoc. The situation looks 
 rather different\, though\, if there is independent evidence from physics 
 for a multiverse. I will argue that independently-motivated multiverses ca
 n be undercutting defeaters for the fine-tuning argument\; but whether the
  argument is indeed undercut still depends on open questions in fundamenta
 l physics and cosmology. I will also argue that Everettian quantum mechani
 cs opens up new routes to undercutting the fine-tuning argument\, although
  by itself it is insufficient to do so.\nSpeakers:\nAlastair Wilson (Unive
 rsity of Birmingham)
LOCATION:Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room\, Second Floor)\, Woodstock Ro
 ad OX2 6GG
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/42d51725-173b-425b-ac3c-d9f17833d2d8/
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DESCRIPTION:Talk:How multiverses might undercut the fine-tuning argument -
  Alastair Wilson (University of Birmingham)
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