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SUMMARY:'Restoring trust in finance' with Gordon Menzies - Gordon Menzies 
 (University of Technology Sydney)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20170221T170000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20170221T181500Z
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/98574536-4008-42f4-8f97-4be008cd9f4f/
DESCRIPTION:This lecture is a joint event between the Oxford Martin School
  and The Institute of New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School\n\
 nDishonest practices brought to light by the 2008 crisis have raised quest
 ions about the incentives faced by bankers\, and about their training. Unf
 ortunately\, the remedy of using market discipline through competition pol
 icy to make bankers 'behave' is problematic.\n\nSo there have been many ca
 lls for more ethical bankers\, but what might this actually look like in p
 ractice? Our answer is given by the idea of 'principled agents' who at tim
 es exhibit a high degree of concern for others in standard economic calcul
 ations and at other times operate from moral principle. But how compatible
  is the use of moral principles with standard economic cost benefit analys
 is?\nSpeakers:\nGordon Menzies (University of Technology Sydney)
LOCATION:Lecture Theatre
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/98574536-4008-42f4-8f97-4be008cd9f4f/
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DESCRIPTION:Talk:'Restoring trust in finance' with Gordon Menzies - Gordon
  Menzies (University of Technology Sydney)
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SUMMARY:Restoring trust in finance: Competition or moral motivation? - Gor
 don Menzies (University of Technology Sydney)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20161031T170000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20161031T184500Z
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/de327ccc-1639-42c5-930f-e2f4ee203972/
DESCRIPTION:We outline a narrative of changing attitudes to social respons
 ibility by managers in the finance industry\, in response to bonus-based c
 ompensation crowding out other-regarding preferences (Simpson\, 2016). We 
 attribute part of the motivation crowding out to their mode of thinking\, 
 namely simple utility maximization\, conceived of as a norm promoting indi
 vidual financial reward. We decompose the resultant loss in consumer surpl
 us into the sum of a cost of commitment incurred by managers when they vol
 untarily eschew monopoly (Sen\, 1976) plus the deadweight loss to the econ
 omy when they do not. Disciplining managers unwilling to pay the cost of c
 ommitment by competition policy runs into serious difficulties which are p
 rominent in the finance industry: the longevity of poorly performing firms
 \, information opacity and rent ubiquity. The practical difficulties of co
 mpetition policy make it correspondingly important to directly address the
  moral motivations of bank executives.\nSpeakers:\nGordon Menzies (Univers
 ity of Technology Sydney)
LOCATION:St Antony's College - North Site (Seminar Room\, European Studies
  Centre\, 70 Woodstock Road\, Oxford OX2 6HR )
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/de327ccc-1639-42c5-930f-e2f4ee203972/
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DESCRIPTION:Talk:Restoring trust in finance: Competition or moral motivati
 on? - Gordon Menzies (University of Technology Sydney)
TRIGGER:-PT1H
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