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BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:"Sowing the Seeds: A Theory of Indoctrination and Counterinsurgenc
 y"--Colloquium with Scott A. Tyson - Scott A. Tyson (University of Rochest
 er)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190226T133000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190226T143000Z
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/82b71c37-6f2b-4bd6-8a63-727eb9f8e51a/
DESCRIPTION:"Insurgent groups are a persistent feature of the developing w
 orld\, but what explains the political prominence of these organizations? 
 Existing explanations tend to focus on the quality of governance\, arguing
  that insurgent groups survive because governments are incapable of defeat
 ing them\, however\, this can occur through several distinct channels. In 
 this paper\, we propose an alternative\, tactical\, explanation that empha
 sizes the importance of the recruitment efforts of insurgent leaders and i
 ts link to the aggressiveness of counterinsurgency efforts. In particular\
 , our explanation focuses on the unique role of ideological indoctrination
 \, and the upstream strategic incentives that indoctrination creates. We d
 evelop a model that studies the interaction between an established insurge
 nt leadership\, the counterinsurgency wing of the government\, and the civ
 ilian population. Because indoctrinated citizens will oppose the governmen
 t without the coordinating efforts of insurgent leaders\, counterinsurgenc
 y efforts targeting organizational aspects of the insurgency become less v
 aluable as more citizens become indoctrinated. We also examine how changes
  in economic conditions affect how much effort insurgent leaders are willi
 ng to invest in indoctrinating citizens."\nSpeakers:\nScott A. Tyson (Univ
 ersity of Rochester)
LOCATION:CESS
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/82b71c37-6f2b-4bd6-8a63-727eb9f8e51a/
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ACTION:display
DESCRIPTION:Talk:"Sowing the Seeds: A Theory of Indoctrination and Counter
 insurgency"--Colloquium with Scott A. Tyson - Scott A. Tyson (University o
 f Rochester)
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:"Winning Hearts and Minds in Civil Wars: Governance\, Leadership C
 hange\, and Support for Violence in Iraq" -- Colloquium with Saurabh Pant 
 - Saurabh Pant (Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST))
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190305T133000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190305T143000Z
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/199aad3c-e24a-45e3-b6e1-1a2b264a4d68/
DESCRIPTION:"The ‘hearts and minds’ model of counterinsurgency holds t
 hat civilians are less likely to support an insurgency if the government p
 rovides basic public services and security. Building on this model\, we ar
 gue that a major political event that raises popular expectations of futur
 e public service and security provision will increase support for the gove
 rnment and decrease sympathy for the insurgency. To test this argument\, w
 e leverage a unique research design opportunity that stems from the unfore
 seen announcement of the resignation of Iraq’s divisive prime minister i
 n August 2014 while an original survey was being administered across the c
 ountry. We show that the leadership transition led Iraq’s displeased Sun
 ni minority to shift support away from the insurgency to the government. I
 n line with our argument\, this realignment was due to rising optimism amo
 ng Iraqi Sunnis that the new government would provide basic services and p
 ublic goods - specifically security\, electricity\, and jobs."\nSpeakers:\
 nSaurabh Pant (Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST))
LOCATION:CESS
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/199aad3c-e24a-45e3-b6e1-1a2b264a4d68/
BEGIN:VALARM
ACTION:display
DESCRIPTION:Talk:"Winning Hearts and Minds in Civil Wars: Governance\, Lea
 dership Change\, and Support for Violence in Iraq" -- Colloquium with Saur
 abh Pant - Saurabh Pant (Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST))
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BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:"The Effects of Communication on the Occurrence of the Tyranny of 
 the Majority under Voting by Veto" -- Colloquium by Jan Sauermann - Jan Sa
 uermann (University of Cologne)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190219T133000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190219T143000Z
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/97c9962c-9a78-4afa-a6ca-31fe68893292/
DESCRIPTION:"The tyranny of the majority is one of the most frequently dis
 cussed problems of democracy in political theory. It arises when winning m
 ajorities are fixed and permanent\, and there are no checks on the majorit
 y’s ability to dominate the minority. In this project\, we investigate t
 he effects of communication on the occurrence of majority domination. Theo
 retically\, communication cuts both ways. On the one hand\, forming and ma
 intaining a coalition requires coordination between individuals\, which is
  barely accomplishable without opportunities to communicate. On the other 
 hand\, communication strengthens pro-social orientations in groups and sho
 uld thus prevent the permanent exclusion of minorities. We argue that the 
 pro-social effects of communication dominate when communication is public 
 whereas exclusive majorities form under private communication. We test our
  claim in a series of laboratory experiments where five-member committees 
 make distributional decisions using the voting mechanism ‘voting by veto
 ’. Communication is our treatment variable. Compared to a baseline treat
 ment without communication\, groups distribute benefits more equally when 
 they have the opportunity to communicate in a public chat. When communicat
 ion is private\, however\, we see the formation of majority coalitions tha
 t exclude a minority of group members from the distribution of benefits."\
 nSpeakers:\nJan Sauermann (University of Cologne)
LOCATION:CESS
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/97c9962c-9a78-4afa-a6ca-31fe68893292/
BEGIN:VALARM
ACTION:display
DESCRIPTION:Talk:"The Effects of Communication on the Occurrence of the Ty
 ranny of the Majority under Voting by Veto" -- Colloquium by Jan Sauermann
  - Jan Sauermann (University of Cologne)
TRIGGER:-PT1H
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BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:"The World on One Island: Formation and Deployment of Group Member
 ship in Multi-Identity Societies" -- Colloquium with Dominik Duell - Domin
 ik Duell (University of Essex)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190212T133000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190212T143000Z
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/a4ca733a-1ac1-4373-8125-43a43f2f09db/
DESCRIPTION:(with Heidi Colleran) "We propose to implement a lab-in-the-fi
 eld study on the island of Malekula\, Vanuatu\, to investigate cooperation
  within a heterogenous society. Vanuatu\, per capita the most linguistical
 ly diverse country on earth\, provides a perfect case in multiculturalism 
 featuring unique variation in regional\, tribal\, religious\, and linguist
 ic group markers but a high degree of homogeneity in other socio-economic 
 determinants of human behavior. Building on extensive ethnographic work\, 
 we adapt standard behavioral games to the specifics of the field site allo
 wing for novel insights on multiple competing identities\, research that i
 s only possible in such a society where not only multiple identities exist
  but where they also matter differently in different contexts. To this end
 \, we elicit with whom individuals prefer to interact\, their choices\, an
 d their beliefs about others' behavior while varying the salience of one o
 r another of the existing multi-level identities. While Vanuatu represents
  a rather unique environment\, inferences from a society where diversity i
 s enshrined in various aspects of life will be crucial to understand the e
 ffects of identities in a more and more diverse world."\nSpeakers:\nDomini
 k Duell (University of Essex)
LOCATION:CESS
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/a4ca733a-1ac1-4373-8125-43a43f2f09db/
BEGIN:VALARM
ACTION:display
DESCRIPTION:Talk:"The World on One Island: Formation and Deployment of Gro
 up Membership in Multi-Identity Societies" -- Colloquium with Dominik Duel
 l - Dominik Duell (University of Essex)
TRIGGER:-PT1H
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BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:"How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Countrywide Experime
 nts in Belgium" -- Seminar with Jan-Emmanuel de Neve & Clément Imbert - J
 an-Emmanuel de Neve (University of Oxford)\, Clément Imbert (University o
 f Warwick)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190306T153000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190306T163000Z
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/5d0a137f-404a-4544-b9e7-d4799da4035b/
DESCRIPTION:TBA\nSpeakers:\nJan-Emmanuel de Neve (University of Oxford)\, 
 Clément Imbert (University of Warwick)
LOCATION:Butler Room (Nuffield College)
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/5d0a137f-404a-4544-b9e7-d4799da4035b/
BEGIN:VALARM
ACTION:display
DESCRIPTION:Talk:"How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Countrywide
  Experiments in Belgium" -- Seminar with Jan-Emmanuel de Neve & Clément I
 mbert - Jan-Emmanuel de Neve (University of Oxford)\, Clément Imbert (Uni
 versity of Warwick)
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BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:"Voting Corrupt Politicians Out of Office? Evidence from an Experi
 ment in Paraguay"--Seminar with Karine Van Der Straeten - Karine Van Der S
 traeten (Tolouse School of Economics)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190227T153000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190227T163000Z
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/ba550f83-f6d2-4399-808b-1061387d0d75/
DESCRIPTION:Co-Authors: Rumilda Cañete\, Josepa Miquel-Florensa (TSE & IA
 ST)\, Stéphane Straub (TSE & IAST). "This paper challenges the convention
 al wisdom that giving voters more power - both formally through the use of
  more ‘open’ electoral systems\, and informally through easier access 
 to information about politicians' wrongdoings - will necessarily result in
  them voting corrupt politicians out of office. First\, focusing on a comp
 arison between closed-list and open-list proportional representation syste
 ms\, we show theoretically that opening the lists is likely to generate a 
 large shift of vote shares in favor of the traditional\, most corrupt part
 ies. Second\, we design a survey experiment to test these predictions in P
 araguay\, and find strong supporting evidence. Last\, we do not find in ou
 r context that the lack of information about politicians' wrongdoings is a
  major obstacle preventing voters to vote out corrupt politicians\; if any
 thing\, we find that under the more open system\, supporters of the incumb
 ent party actually exhibit a ‘preference’ for corrupt politicians."\nS
 peakers:\nKarine Van Der Straeten (Tolouse School of Economics)
LOCATION:Nuffield College
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/ba550f83-f6d2-4399-808b-1061387d0d75/
BEGIN:VALARM
ACTION:display
DESCRIPTION:Talk:"Voting Corrupt Politicians Out of Office? Evidence from 
 an Experiment in Paraguay"--Seminar with Karine Van Der Straeten - Karine 
 Van Der Straeten (Tolouse School of Economics)
TRIGGER:-PT1H
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:"Revealed Privacy Preferences: Are Privacy Choices Rational?" -- S
 eminar with Roberto Weber - Roberto Weber (University of Zurich)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190213T153000Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190213T163000Z
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/8b875567-ee3c-4907-bccf-52dd7304d19e/
DESCRIPTION:"(with Yi-Shan Lee) The development of effective privacy polic
 ies rests critically on the question of whether people are capable of enga
 ging in rational tradeoffs regarding the use of their personal information
 . This study employs an economic approach to investigate the extent to whi
 ch people's decisions in this domain exhibit consistency with an underlyin
 g rational preference for privacy. We develop a novel experiment in which 
 people allocate privacy levels between two personal information items. Thi
 s allows us to classify people depending on whether their choices are cons
 istent with the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference. We find 63 perce
 nt of subjects act consistently with a rational preference ordering when a
 llocating privacy levels\, despite the substantial heterogeneity of privac
 y attitudes. We further investigate the extent to which these revealed pri
 vacy preferences can be measured by monetary equivalents and whether prefe
 rences elicited over choices in our experiment predict real-world privacy 
 behavior. The classification of rationality from choices is predictive of 
 monetary tradeoffs: irrational types\, on average\, squander 260 percent m
 ore money than rational types through inconsistencies in their monetary va
 luations. Despite the presence of noise\, monetary valuations nevertheless
  capture some of the underlying privacy preferences\, as more private type
 s require significantly more compensation for sharing personal data. Final
 ly\, the measures of privacy preferences elicited in the laboratory are co
 rrelated with a widely-used question eliciting self-reported privacy conce
 rns and with some behavioral outcomes in real-world domains of personal in
 formation sharing. We conclude that the heterogeneity in rationality obser
 ved even in fairly simple choice contexts should be considered when design
 ing future privacy policies."\nSpeakers:\nRoberto Weber (University of Zur
 ich)
LOCATION:Butler Room (Nuffield College)
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/8b875567-ee3c-4907-bccf-52dd7304d19e/
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ACTION:display
DESCRIPTION:Talk:"Revealed Privacy Preferences: Are Privacy Choices Ration
 al?" -- Seminar with Roberto Weber - Roberto Weber (University of Zurich)
TRIGGER:-PT1H
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BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY: Incentives for Conformity and Disconformity - Urs Fischbacher (Un
 iversity of Konstanz)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20180523T160000
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20180523T170000
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/1215e1ff-4561-4618-b23d-bf589581d785/
DESCRIPTION:To sign up for meetings please click the link:\n\nhttps://docs
 .google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Mj4iRDyUK7t4GzlmE9H-H5QIUqET8_jpOw1rHMHCHtA/ed
 it#gid=0\n\nAbstract:\nThere is abundant evidence for conformity but there
  are also situations in which people try to set themselves apart. We inves
 tigate how punishment and reward affect these behaviors. We rely on a 3 (p
 unishment vs. no incentive vs. reward) x 2 (arts vs. quiz) experiment desi
 gn. First\, two subjects make a binary choice. In the arts treatment\, the
 y choose one out of two arts postcards and in the quiz treatment\, they ch
 oose one out of two answers to a difficult knowledge question. Then\, a th
 ird person makes the same choice\, knowing the decision of the first two s
 ubjects. Since this third person also makes unconditional decisions in whi
 ch the two options each are compared with a third option\, we can infer wh
 ether subjects make conform\, disconform\, or autonomous choices. Finally\
 , evaluators are shown the three choices of a group and\, depending on the
  treatment\, assign a bonus or a deduction to one of the three subjects. W
 e find that punishment leads to more conformity and reward leads to more d
 isconformity\, and we find more conformity in the quiz treatments than in 
 the arts treatments. Disconformity is rare. It exists only in the reward t
 reatment and it is stronger in the arts than in the quiz treatment.\nSpeak
 ers:\nUrs Fischbacher (University of Konstanz)
LOCATION:Nuffield College (Butler room)\, New Road OX1 1NF
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/1215e1ff-4561-4618-b23d-bf589581d785/
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ACTION:display
DESCRIPTION:Talk: Incentives for Conformity and Disconformity - Urs Fischb
 acher (University of Konstanz)
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BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Where Terror Lies: Social Desirability Bias and Violent Extremism 
 in the Sahel - Steven E. Finkel ( University of Pittsburgh)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20180606T160000
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20180606T170000
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/6fc0a594-0e80-4520-bdb6-cf40422f4bee/
DESCRIPTION:Researchers have commonly treated social desirability biases i
 n survey questions as a measurement or statistical nuisance rather than a 
 phenomenon of substantive importance. This study departs from that approac
 h and envisages bias in support for violent extremism – both under- and 
 over-reporting – as a phenomenon with important implications for how ter
 rorist violence unfolds. Using data from over 5\,000 respondents in 34 com
 munes in Burkina Faso\, Chad\, and Niger collected just prior to and just 
 after a recent wave of terrorist attacks\, we find that communes where ind
 ividuals under-report their true support for violent extremism have a grea
 ter probability of experiencing subsequent Islamist attacks\, controlling 
 for socio-demographic characteristics of the commune\, country-level proxi
 mity effects\, and other time-varying factors. Moreover\, a commune’s ex
 perience of an attack then results in lower levels of under-reporting of e
 xtremist support in subsequent surveys\, relative to communes that did not
  experience attacks.\nSpeakers:\nSteven E. Finkel ( University of Pittsbur
 gh)
LOCATION:Nuffield College (Butler room)\, New Road OX1 1NF
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/6fc0a594-0e80-4520-bdb6-cf40422f4bee/
BEGIN:VALARM
ACTION:display
DESCRIPTION:Talk:Where Terror Lies: Social Desirability Bias and Violent E
 xtremism in the Sahel - Steven E. Finkel ( University of Pittsburgh)
TRIGGER:-PT1H
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:The Welfare Effects of Social Recognition: Theory and Evidence fro
 m a Field Experiment with the YMCA - Robert D. Metcalfe (University of Bos
 ton)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20180601T140000
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20180601T150000
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/f3555bb7-8976-4841-9704-5434d8a3dfae/
DESCRIPTION:A growing body of empirical work shows that social recognition
  can meaningfully influence individuals’ choices. This paper investigate
 s whether social recognition is a socially efficient lever for influencing
  individuals’ decisions. Theoretically\, we show that whether social rec
 ognition is more efficient than financial incentives depends on the shape 
 of the social recognition utility function\, which determines whether soci
 al signaling is a positive-sum\, negative-sum\, or zero-sum game. To quant
 ify the theoretical findings\, we report results from a novel field experi
 ment on promoting attendance to the YMCA. We quantify the impact of social
  recognition on attendance and elicit people’s willingness to pay for so
 cial recognition in different future states of the world. We find that soc
 ial recognition increases YMCA attendance by 23% over a one-month period. 
 We then estimate people’s willingness to pay to be recognized at varying
  levels of attendance\, and find that social signaling is a moderately pos
 itive-sum game. Unlike previous attempts at evaluating “nudges”\, we a
 re able to generate our welfare estimates using non-parametric methods tha
 t do not rely on the assumption that individuals hold rational expectation
 s about their future behavior. Our experimental framework provides a gener
 al template for robustly evaluating the welfare effects of non-financial p
 olicy levers.\nSpeakers:\nRobert D. Metcalfe (University of Boston)
LOCATION:Nuffield College (Butler room)\, New Road OX1 1NF
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/f3555bb7-8976-4841-9704-5434d8a3dfae/
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ACTION:display
DESCRIPTION:Talk:The Welfare Effects of Social Recognition: Theory and Evi
 dence from a Field Experiment with the YMCA - Robert D. Metcalfe (Universi
 ty of Boston)
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BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Taming Intuition: How Reflection Minimizes Partisan Biases - Kevin
  Arceneaux (University of Temple)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20180518T140000
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20180518T150000
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/670ec074-8e07-4bbf-8704-481ddf89d4cc/
DESCRIPTION:Democracy rests on the idea that the people should govern them
 selves. In modern democracies\, effective self-governance requires people 
 to vote for candidates who share their values and against those who fail t
 o live up to their expectations. Are voters up to this task? Decades of re
 search suggests that people are blinded by their partisan attachments\, ma
 king them more interested in rooting for their party than in holding elect
 ed officials accountable. We address this question by constructing the Int
 uitionist Model of Political Reasoning\, which incorporates advances about
  the workings of the human mind made by cognitive sciences. Contrary to ca
 nonical models of political reasoning that treat reasoning as an entirely 
 conscious act\, this model recognizes that people’s decisions are guided
  by unconsciously formed intuitions. In politics\, people’s intuitive re
 sponse is to root for their partisan team. When this intuitive response le
 ads people astray - such as when their party leaders make bad decisions - 
 democratic theory requires that they reflect on their intuitive response a
 nd vote against their party. It turns out that people vary in their willin
 gness to be reflective and\, as a result\, in their ability to live up to 
 the demands of self-governance.\nSpeakers:\nKevin Arceneaux (University of
  Temple)
LOCATION:Nuffield College (Butler room)\, New Road OX1 1NF
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/670ec074-8e07-4bbf-8704-481ddf89d4cc/
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ACTION:display
DESCRIPTION:Talk:Taming Intuition: How Reflection Minimizes Partisan Biase
 s - Kevin Arceneaux (University of Temple)
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