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SUMMARY:Delegated Contracting - Udayan Vaidya (Duke's Fuqua School of Busi
 ness)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260213T141500Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260213T153000Z
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/1825318f-370e-4ca9-9edd-d92d076ae861/
DESCRIPTION:A principal seeks to contract with an agent but must do so thr
 ough an informed delegate. Although the principal cannot directly mediate 
 the interaction\, she can constrain the menus of contracts the delegate ma
 y offer. We show that the principal can implement any outcome that is impl
 ementable through a direct mechanism satisfying dominant strategy incentiv
 e compatibility and ex-post participation for the agent. We apply this res
 ult to several settings. First\, we show that a government that delegates 
 procurement to a budget-indulgent agency should delegate an interval of sc
 reening contracts. Second\, we show that a seller can delegate sales to an
  intermediary without revenue loss\, provided she can commit to a return p
 olicy. Third\, in contrast to centralized mechanism design\, we demonstrat
 e that no partnership can be efficiently dissolved in the absence of a med
 iator. Finally\, we discuss when delegated contracting obstructs efficienc
 y\, and when choosing the right delegate may help restore it.\nSpeakers:\n
 Udayan Vaidya (Duke's Fuqua School of Business)
LOCATION:Manor Road Building (Seminar Room G)\, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
TZID:Europe/London
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/1825318f-370e-4ca9-9edd-d92d076ae861/
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DESCRIPTION:Talk:Delegated Contracting - Udayan Vaidya (Duke's Fuqua Schoo
 l of Business)
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