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SUMMARY:A Perspective-Invariant Approach to Nash Bargaining - Barry Nalebu
ff (Yale School of Management)
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20200310T124500Z
DTEND;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20200310T134500Z
UID:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/e27f84ec-405e-404f-9421-523e9b777c7d/
DESCRIPTION:The Nash axioms lead to different results depending on whether
the negotiation is framed in terms of gains relative to no agreement or i
n terms of sacrifices relative to an ideal. We look for a solution that le
ads to the same result from both perspectives. To do so\, we restrict the
application of Nash's IIA axiom to bargaining sets where all options are i
ndividually rational and none exceed either party's ideal point. If we nor
malize the bargaining set so that the disagreement point is (0\; 0) and ma
ximal gains are (1\; 1)\, then any perspective- invariant bargaining solut
ion must lie between the Utilitarian solution and the maximal equal-gain (
minimal equal-sacrifice) solution. We show that a modified version of Nash
's symmetry axiom leads to the Utilitarian solution and that a reciprocity
axiom leads to the equal-gain (equal-sacrifice) solution\, both of which
are perspective invariant.\nSpeakers:\nBarry Nalebuff (Yale School of Mana
gement)
LOCATION:Nuffield College (Butler Room)\, New Road OX1 1NF
URL:https://talks.ox.ac.uk/talks/id/e27f84ec-405e-404f-9421-523e9b777c7d/
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DESCRIPTION:Talk:A Perspective-Invariant Approach to Nash Bargaining - Bar
ry Nalebuff (Yale School of Management)
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