On 28th November OxTalks will move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events' (full details are available on the Staff Gateway).
There will be an OxTalks freeze beginning on Friday 14th November. This means you will need to publish any of your known events to OxTalks by then as there will be no facility to publish or edit events in that fortnight. During the freeze, all events will be migrated to the new Oxford Events site. It will still be possible to view events on OxTalks during this time.
If you have any questions, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
Abstract
Negotiation is a ubiquitous and consequential form of economic interaction. It is deal-making in the absence of a designer. We propose a theory of negotiation in which deals have many aspects. This leads to a new perspective on the welfare consequences of asymmetric information, which we examine via both theory and experiments. In a robust class of settings of asymmetric information, it is in each agent’s interest to truthfully reveal her private information, which comes about because of the benefits of identifying areas of mutual gain. We show that equilibria are efficient, with significant implications for applications.
The paper is available below:
www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/media/2534/bargaining-mp-04122018.pdf
