OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
A decision maker (DM), who will take a binary decision, cares about his reputation for being “good,” i.e., wanting to accord his action choice with public evidence, as opposed to being “bad,” i.e., having a fixed partisan agenda regardless of the evidence. While the decision is taken after evidence is realized, the DM has the option to take a “stand” beforehand, i.e., to communicate his intentions via a cheap-talk message. A wide range of equilibria exist and are characterized by how much the good DM reveals about his standards at this initial communication stage. The most informative of these is ex-ante signaling, which sees the DM effectively commit to a contingent plan as a function of the realized evidence. Our main theorem shows that, across all equilibria, ex-ante signaling minimizes the probability that the DM follows his partisan agenda.
