Locally Controlled Minimum Wages Are No Closer to Public Preferences
Please note that registration will close on 25 January.
Does decentralizing policymaking authority lead to a closer match between public policies and citizen preferences? We study this question in the context of U.S. minimum wage laws. Using novel survey data and aggregation methods, we generate estimates of minimum wage preferences for all U.S. cities and compare them to actual minimum wages. We find that prevailing minimum wages are generally lower than residents prefer, and this conservative bias is most pronounced in states with pre-emption laws. However, locally controlled minimum wages leapfrog public preferences and are higher than residents want, on average. Finally, we consider how various counterfactual policies might improve representation and conclude that a top-down approach with minimum wages tailored to local conditions would produce the closest match between preferences and policies.
Date:
28 January 2021, 16:00 (Thursday, 2nd week, Hilary 2021)
Venue:
Zoom Webinar
Speakers:
Gabor Simonovits (CEU),
Julia Payson (NYU)
Organising department:
Department of Social Policy and Intervention
Organisers:
Dr Rossella Ciccia (University of Oxford),
Dr Marek Naczyk (University of Oxford)
Organiser contact email address:
communications@spi.ox.ac.uk
Hosts:
Dr Rossella Ciccia (University of Oxford),
Dr Marek Naczyk (University of Oxford)
Part of:
OISP Seminar Series: A New Dawn for Social Policy
Booking required?:
Required
Booking url:
https://forms.office.com/Pages/ResponsePage.aspx?id=G96VzPWXk0-0uv5ouFLPkXU22tvMWYpBtVi0MQ2zuK9UREZYQ1pPRjFESEIxU0hZQlFPMjZXQ09ZMy4u
Cost:
FREE
Audience:
Public
Editor:
Lani Fukada
