Social Learning Equilibria
Full details of this seminar series are available at the following link:
www.davidronayne.net/lgn-seminar

We consider social learning settings in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state of the world, observe private signals, share the same utility function, and act in a general dynamic setting. We introduce Social Learning Equilibria, a static equilibrium concept that abstracts away from the details of the given extensive form, but nevertheless captures the corresponding asymptotic equilibrium behavior. We establish conditions for agreement, herding, and information aggregation in equilibrium, highlighting a connection between agreement and information aggregation.
Date: 23 October 2018, 12:45 (Tuesday, 3rd week, Michaelmas 2018)
Venue: Nuffield College, New Road OX1 1NF
Venue Details: Butler Room
Speaker: Manuel Mueller-Frank (IESE, Navarra)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Learning, Games and Network Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editors: Erin Saunders, Melis Clark