Are Simple Mechanisms Optimal when Agents are Unsophisticated? (with Jiangtao Li)
We study the design of mechanisms involving agents that have limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be simple if—given the assumed level of strategic sophistication—agents can determine their optimal strategy. We examine whether it is optimal for the mechanism designer who faces strategically unsophisticated agents to offer a simple mechanism. We show that when the designer uses a mechanism that is not simple, while she loses the ability to predict play, she may nevertheless be better off no matter how agents resolve their strategic confusion.
Date: 8 March 2022, 12:45 (Tuesday, 8th week, Hilary 2022)
Venue: Join Zoom Meeting: https://zoom.us/j/99759486691
Speaker: Piotr Dworczak (Northwestern Univ. (visiting Oxford))
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Economic Theory Workshop
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Emma Heritage