Who Gets Protection from Protectionism? Evidence from the Buy American Act
Contemporary protectionist policies in the U.S. are often initiated by the executive branch but enforced unevenly across firms. We argue that such uneven enforcement arises because legislators—with both institutional capacity and local motivation—shield connected firms from executive protectionist measures. We test this claim using the Trump administration’s Buy American Act (BAA), which penalized firms reliant on foreign, especially Chinese, suppliers. Combining firm-level data on federal contracts, supply chains, and campaign contributions, we analyze 1,958 firms (2015–2019). A difference-in-differences design shows that the BAA significantly reduced contracts for firms with Chinese suppliers, but only among politically inactive firms in districts represented by less powerful House members or by members lacking strong local ties. We also find that only less-connected firms adjusted their suppliers after the BAA. These findings highlight the importance of distinguishing between the adoption and implementation of protectionist policies, and how legislators shape implementation amidst presidential dominance in trade policy.
Date: 5 December 2025, 13:00
Venue: Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details: Seminar Room C
Speaker: Hye Young You (Princeton University)
Organising department: Department of Politics and International Relations (DPIR)
Part of: Politics Research Colloquium
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editors: Alexander Kuo, Nichola Anderson