Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. From now until the launch of Oxford Events, new events cannot be published or edited on OxTalks while all existing records are migrated to the new platform. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period.
From 16th, Oxford Events will launch on a new website: events.ox.ac.uk, and event submissions will resume. You will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
We study agents playing a pure coordination game on a large social network. Agents are restricted to coordinate locally, without access to a global communication device, and so different regions of the network will converge to different actions, precluding perfect coordination. We show that the extent of this inefficiency depends on the network geometry: on some networks, near-perfect efficiency is achievable, while on others welfare is strictly bounded away from the optimum. We provide a geometric condition on the network structure that characterizes when near-efficiency is attainable. On networks in which it is unattainable, our results more generally preclude high correlations between outcomes in a large spectrum of dynamic games.
