Union and Firm Labor Market Power
Can union and firm market power counteract each other? What are the output and welfare effects of employer and union labor market power? Using data from French manufacturing firms, we leverage mass layoff shocks to competitors to identify a negative effect of employment concentration on wages. In line with the reduced form evidence and the French institutional setting, we develop and estimate a multi-sector bargaining model that incorporates employer market power. We find that, in the absence of unions, output decreases by 0.48 percent because they partially counteract distortions coming from oligopsony power. The reallocation of employment across space is key to realize the output gains from unions.
Date:
29 April 2025, 13:15
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room A
Speaker:
Miren Azkarate-Askasua (University of Mannheim)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Macroeconomics Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Edward Clark
