The Immaterial Mind and the Immortal Soul

Abstract: Beginning in the late 1950s, and with a few exceptions, anglophone philosophers began to adopt one of two views about the nature of mind. Materialism (the mind is the brain) or Behaviourism (talk of mind is to be interpreted in terms of bodily behaviour). These views were qualified, refined, revised but in general the prevailing orthodoxies reject the idea of immateriality and certainly that of an immortal soul. Even so the trajectory of philosophical thinking has remained quite divergent. This lecture will review some of these issues and turn to consideration of two lines of thought that claim to be different from those mentioned, both linked to the thought of Wittgenstein. That of Strawson, that Persons area special kind of subject, and that (or those) of Anscombe and Wittgenstein. The special interest of the latter in this context is that they both held to the Christian belief in a future life. This also raises the questions how are their views related to that of Aquinas, and how should his view be regarded. These various considerations will lead in turn to the broader question is some form of dualism tenable?