Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. From now until the launch of Oxford Events, new events cannot be published or edited on OxTalks while all existing records are migrated to the new platform. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period.
From 16th, Oxford Events will launch on a new website: events.ox.ac.uk, and event submissions will resume. You will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
Sign up for meetings on the sheet below:
docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/13ovx0deRg8mA3h5XVO95SLGQcZQMTAcbZiTKaGFTKvs/edit#gid=0
If signing up less than two days before the talk, please also email facultyadmin@economics.ox.ac.uk
Abstract:
Empirical analyses of school choice report standard statistics of student outcomes that are the same for a variety of different mechanisms. This paper explains this puzzle as being driven by two factors: market size and the invariance properties of the statistics for which the equivalence has been observed. In large markets, strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms lead to asymptotically the same realized outcome statistics. Furthermore, many standard mechanisms—such as serial dictatorship or top trading cycles—lead to the same expected outcome-statistics already in finite markets under the additional assumption that the distributions of preferences are exchangeable.
View the related paper: pycia.bol.ucla.edu/pycia-invariance.pdf
