In this paper, we provide systematic evidence in support of the long-standing hypothesis that taxation was an important driver of the French Revolution. We first document that areas with heavier taxes experienced more riots between 1750 and 1789 and voiced more complaints against taxation in the {cahiers de dol\‘eances} of 1789. After showing that these effects are driven by indirect taxes, we exploit sharp changes in the salt tax and the {traites}—the two principal indirect levies—to implement a regression discontinuity design (RDD). We find that unrest was higher on the high-tax side of the border. These effects intensified over time, peaking in the 1780s, and were stronger where fiscal disparities were larger and Enlightenment ideas more widespread. Combining the RDD with weather shocks during the 1780s, we further show that unusually hot summers amplified unrest in high-tax municipalities. We then document that taxation fuelled the spread of unrest during the {Grande Peur}—the wave of revolts that swept France in July 1789 and culminated in the abolition of feudal privileges. Finally, we link taxation to revolutionary politics in Paris, documenting that deputies from heavily taxed constituencies were more likely to frame the tax system as oppressive and unequal, support the Revolution, demand the abolition of the monarchy, and vote for the king’s execution.