On 28th November OxTalks will move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events' (full details are available on the Staff Gateway).
There will be an OxTalks freeze beginning on Friday 14th November. This means you will need to publish any of your known events to OxTalks by then as there will be no facility to publish or edit events in that fortnight. During the freeze, all events will be migrated to the new Oxford Events site. It will still be possible to view events on OxTalks during this time.
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Two competing firms first choose locations, and then — having observed each other — choose prices so as to attract consumers, who must also pay a linear ‘transport’ cost. Hotelling (1929) assumed a unit continuum of consumers in order to solve this model, but unfortunately this didn’t accomplish its purpose: a series of papers since then have shown that fully characterizing the (necessarily mixed) equilibrium is essentially intractable. Here we instead assume only two consumers and are able to completely describe actions in both stages of the unique symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium. For some parameters it represents naturalistic behavior (e.g. differentiation and random sales), while for other parameters it is surprisingly complex (e.g. a countable infinity of accumulation mass-points in the location sub-game).
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