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Optimal Monitoring
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docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/13ovx0deRg8mA3h5XVO95SLGQcZQMTAcbZiTKaGFTKvs/edit#gid=0
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Abstract:
This paper considers a Principal-Agent model with hidden action in which the Principal can monitor the Agent by acquiring independent signals conditional on effort at a constant marginal cost. The Principal aims to implement a target effort level at minimal cost. The main result of the paper is that the optimal information acquisition strategy is a two-threshold policy and, consequently, the equilibrium contract specifies two possible wages for the Agent. This result provides a rationale for the frequently observed single-bonus wage-contracts.
Date:
9 February 2018, 14:15
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
IT Room
Speaker:
Balazs Szentes (London School of Economics (LSE))
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editors:
Erin Saunders,
Anne Pouliquen
