Search, Matching, and Online Platforms
Recent technological advances offer solutions to alleviate search and information frictions in matching markets. Consequently, online platforms have emerged as dominant players in modern matching markets. We explore the incentives of an online platform to harness further technological advances through the lens of a dynamic two-sided search model with horizontally differentiated agents and platform mediated search-and-matching. We find that the platform has incentives to invest in reducing search frictions, but lacks incentives to improve the quality of information it collects and shares about the compatibility of potential partners. Moreover, in equilibrium, reductions in search frictions and improvements in the quality of information both reduce the fees charged by the monopolistic platform and enhance consumer welfare.
Date: 20 February 2024, 12:45 (Tuesday, 6th week, Hilary 2024)
Venue: Nuffield College, New Road OX1 1NF
Venue Details: Butler Room or https://zoom.us/j/92241183272?pwd=NzBhTVg1d1g5Sm1NRnQ4cU1iS1NmZz09
Speaker: Daniel Bird (Tel Aviv)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Economic Theory Workshop
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Edward Clark