OxTalks is Changing
OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
Rank Uncertainty in Organizations (joint with Marina Halac & Daniel Rappoport)
This workshop will take place on Zoom
A principal incentivizes a team of agents to work by privately offering them bonuses contingent on team success. We study the principal’s optimal incentive scheme that implements work as a unique equilibrium. This scheme leverages rank uncertainty to address strategic uncertainty. Each agent is informed only of a ranking distribution and his own bonus, the latter making work dominant provided that higher-rank agents work. If agents are symmetric, their bonuses are identical. Thus, discrimination is strictly suboptimal, in sharp contrast with the case of public contracts (Winter, 2004). We characterize how agents’ ranking and compensation vary with asymmetric effort costs.
Link to paper: elliotlipnowski.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/HLR_April2020.pdf
Please sign up for meetings here: docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1l_CJXAOQGvxYdmXIOrmhV9c9OFr3yNuwe2UsBfEGs98/edit#gid=0
Date:
19 May 2020, 12:45
Venue:
Venue to be announced
Speaker:
Elliot Lipnowski (Columbia University)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Economic Theory Workshop
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Melis Clark
