Engineering Informal Institutions: Long run impacts of alternative dispute resolution on violence and property rights in Liberia
Informal institutions govern property rights and disputes when formal systems are weak. Well-functioning institutions help people reach and maintain bargains, minimizing violence. Can outside organizations engineer improvements and reduce violent conflicts? Will this improve property rights and investment? We experimentally evaluate a UN and civil society mass education campaign to promote alternative dispute resolution (ADR) practices and norms in rural communities, where violent land disputes are commonplace. Prior work showed a fall in violence and unresolved disputes within a year. We return after three years to test for sustained impacts and channels. Treated communities report large, sustained falls in violent disputes and a slight shift towards nonviolent norms. Treated residents also report larger farms, though overall effects on property rights and investments are mixed. Politically-connected residents report more secure property rights while those with fewer connections feel less secure. Sustained social engineering is feasible but politics can shape distributional outcomes.
Date: 20 February 2018, 12:30
Venue: Nuffield College, New Road OX1 1NF
Venue Details: Clay Room
Speaker: Dr Alexandra Hartman (UCL)
Organising department: Department of Politics and International Relations (DPIR)
Organisers: Professor Desmond Kind (University of Oxford), Ben Ansell (University of Oxford)
Organiser contact email address: maxine.collett@nuffield.ox.ac.uk
Part of: Nuffield College Political Science Seminars
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Maxine Collett