OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
To reserve a time to meet with the speaker, please register at the following form:
docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1kB_yut_BGasxufESRo7Xg3klJRwfec7Zv77Wg1h5pbs/edit#gid=0
Abstract:
We present a model of a financial market where some traders are “cursed” when investing in a risky asset, failing to fully appreciate what prices convey about others’ private information. Markets comprising cursed traders generate more trade than those comprising rationals; mixed markets can generate even more trade because rationals exploit return predictability caused by cursed. Per-trader volume in cursed markets increases with market size; volume may instead disappear when traders infer others’ information from prices but dismiss it as noisier than their own. Public-information revelation raises rational and “dismissive” volume, but lowers cursed volume given moderate non-informational trading motives.
