OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
We study dynamic information design for full implementation in dynamic supermodular games where players’ opportunities to revise their actions arrive stochastically. We show that noisy but conclusive bad news signals uniquely implement the largest equilibrium across all dynamic information structures. Such structures exhibit asymmetry, noise, and state-invariance: asymmetry skews future switching behavior—conditional on bad news not arriving—towards the designer-preferred action which incentivizes switching in the present; noise increases the probability that bad news does not arrive; state-invariance lifts the time-t optimality of continuation information structures to dynamic optimality. There is no multiplicity gap: the largest implementable equilibrium can be implemented uniquely. We discuss applications to macroeconomics, debt runs, and platform competition.
