OxTalks is Changing
OxTalks will soon be transitioning to Oxford Events (full details are available on the Staff Gateway). A two-week publishing freeze is expected in early Hilary to allow all events to be migrated to the new platform. During this period, you will not be able to submit or edit events on OxTalks. The exact freeze dates will be confirmed as soon as possible.
If you have any questions, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
Agency, Potential and Contagion
To reserve a time to meet with the speaker, please register at the following form:
docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1kB_yut_BGasxufESRo7Xg3klJRwfec7Zv77Wg1h5pbs/edit#gid=0
Abstract:
The spread of a novel behavior due to individual agency, as represented by a potential function, is compared to the spread of novel behavior due to the collective agency of those with strategic complementarities. An autonomous set of players is one which might be reasonably expected to adopt the novelty irrespective of the choices of those outside the set. Two forms of autonomy are compared. These are potential autonomy and agency autonomy, which relate to the graph theoretic quantities of close-knittedness and cohesion, respectively. Necessary and sufficient conditions for potential autonomy to imply agency autonomy and vice versa are given and related to different classes of coordination game.
Date:
21 November 2017, 16:30
Venue:
Nuffield College, New Road OX1 1NF
Venue Details:
Conference Room
Speaker:
Jonathan Newton (University of Sydney)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Learning, Games and Network Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editors:
Erin Saunders,
Anne Pouliquen
