On 28th November OxTalks will move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events' (full details are available on the Staff Gateway).
There will be an OxTalks freeze beginning on Friday 14th November. This means you will need to publish any of your known events to OxTalks by then as there will be no facility to publish or edit events in that fortnight. During the freeze, all events will be migrated to the new Oxford Events site. It will still be possible to view events on OxTalks during this time.
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This paper models legislative decision making when an agenda setter proposes amendments in real time. We consider a setting in which voters are sophisticated and the agenda setter cannot commit to her future proposals. Nevertheless, the agenda setter obtains her favorite policy in every equilibrium regardless of the initial status quo. We show that this result applies to a broad class of policy spaces and legislative procedures. Our results overturn the conventional wisdom that voter sophistication on its own constrains an agenda setter’s power.
