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Information Design, Inside Disclosures and Counter-Signalling
We study the resolution of asymmetric information when privately informed agents strategically disclose inside information, while uninformed agents also observe exogenous outside information. We fully characterize the range of possible informational outcomes in equilibrium. A novel effect is that the classic ‘unraveling’ spiral can work in reverse, so that strategic complementarities work in favor of non-disclosure. We establish that better outside information can reduce overall market informativeness by crowding out inside information. In an application to optimal financial stress tests, we show that our results facilitate a tractable analysis of information design. Finally, we derive empirical predictions for corporate disclosures.
Date:
17 January 2019, 13:00
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room C
Speaker:
Dan Quigley (University of Oxford)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Department of Economics Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Melis Clark
