Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. From now until the launch of Oxford Events, new events cannot be published or edited on OxTalks while all existing records are migrated to the new platform. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period.
From 16th, Oxford Events will launch on a new website: events.ox.ac.uk, and event submissions will resume. You will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
“”“We study information design in games with a continuum of actions such that the players’ payoffs are concave in their own actions. A designer chooses an information structure—-a joint distribution of a state and a private signal of each player—-and evaluates it according to the designer’s expected payoff under the equilibrium play in the induced Bayesian game. We show an information structure is designer optimal whenever it induces the equilibrium play that can be implemented by an incentive contract in an auxiliary principal-agent problem with a single agent who observes the state and controls all actions.
We use this result to characterize optimal information structures in a variety of settings, including price competition, first-order Bayesian persuasion, and venture capital fundraising. If the state is normally distributed and the payoffs are quadratic, then in many cases Gaussian information structures are optimal. Fully informing a subset of players can also be optimal and robustly so, for all state distributions.”“”
