Brevity
This project studies incentives for private learning in a game of strategic information transmission. We show that information that is sufficiently costly to acquire can only be transmitted coarsely. We provide comparatives statics results showing that a more nuanced categorization provides weaker incentives for information acquisition than a coarser one. Finally, we consider two welfare-improving extensions: information design and delegation.
Date:
6 February 2024, 12:45 (Tuesday, 4th week, Hilary 2024)
Venue:
Nuffield College, New Road OX1 1NF
Venue Details:
Butler Room or https://zoom.us/j/92241183272?pwd=NzBhTVg1d1g5Sm1NRnQ4cU1iS1NmZz09
Speaker:
Sophie Kreutzkamp (University of Bonn)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Economic Theory Workshop
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Edward Clark
