Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. The two-week OxTalks freeze period starts on Monday 2nd March. During this time, there will be no facility to publish or edit events. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period. Once Oxford Events launches, you will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
We consider the problem of a principal aiming to allocate an indivisible, productivity-enhancing resource—-e.g., computing equipment, a grant, etc.—-to one of many agents. The principal can utilize two instruments previously studied only in isolation but often used together in practice: costly verification and money burning. We identify the optimal allocation protocol, which takes one of two forms. When full separation of types is suboptimal, money burning is not employed, but there is significant pooling. If full separation is optimal, then both instruments are used. Lower types are only subject to money burning. Higher types go through verification and burn money. Notably, money burning is not substituted away.
