Axiology, identity, and lifespan
How much, if at all, should we value the prospect of extending human lifespan? Some of the costs and benefits are clear, and others can be assessed empirically. But we also face various tricky axiological choice-points. For example: Are persons the fundamental units of well-being, or person-stages? Do we measure the value of outcomes with average or total well-being—or something else? Do units of time in a life yield diminishing marginal value, even if they are equally good in other respects? Which relational features, if any, matter in addition to the local features of persons or person-states? Several of the most plausible ways to negotiate these choice-points yield important structural advantages for lifespan extension.
Date: 1 March 2019, 12:00 (Friday, 7th week, Hilary 2019)
Venue: Littlegate House, 16-17 St Ebbe's Street OX1 1PT
Venue Details: Petrov Room
Speaker: David Manley (University of Michigan)
Organising department: Faculty of Philosophy
Organisers: Prof Hilary Greaves (University of Oxford), Rossa O'Keeffe-O'Donovan (Nuffield College)
Organiser contact email address: gpi-office@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Part of: Global Priorities Institute (GPI) Seminar Series
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Public
Editor: James Aung