Uniform Price Auctions with a Last Accepted Bid Pricing Rule
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Abstract
We model multi-unit auctions in which bidders’ valuations are multidimensional private information. We show that the last accepted bid uniform-pricing rule admits a unique equilibrium with a simple characterization; in comparison, the commonly-studied first rejected bid uniform-pricing rule admits many equilibria, many of which provide zero expected revenue. In a natural example, equilibrium strategies in the last accepted bid auction are constructed from familiar strategies for single-unit first price auctions. In contrast with the information pooling we prove to arise in the first rejected bid and pay as bid auctions, the unique equilibrium of the last accepted bid auction is fully revealing.
Link to paper:
kylewoodward.com/research/auto/burkett+woodward-2018A.pdf
Date:
25 May 2018, 14:15
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
IT Room
Speaker:
Kyle Woodward (University of North Carolina)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Organisers:
Anne Pouliquen (University of Oxford),
Erin Saunders (University of Oxford)
Part of:
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editors:
Erin Saunders,
Anne Pouliquen,
Melis Clark
