An Economic Model of Deliberative Democracy
This paper develops a canonical model of deliberative democracy as part of a policy process. It studies how deliberation affects incentives and behaviour in three contexts: (i) compliance with policies (ii) equilibrium policy choices in a representative democracy and (iii) incentives to protest. The paper explores whether there are welfare gains from increased deliberation and how these depend on changes in equilibrium behaviour.
Date:
8 November 2023, 11:00 (Wednesday, 5th week, Michaelmas 2023)
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room A
Speaker:
Professor Sir Tim Besley (LSE)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Political Economy Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Shreyasi Banerjee
