OxTalks is Changing
Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. From now until the launch of Oxford Events, new events cannot be published or edited on OxTalks while all existing records are migrated to the new platform. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period.
From 16th, Oxford Events will launch on a new website: events.ox.ac.uk, and event submissions will resume. You will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
Data Monetization and Strategic Coordination
We consider games of incomplete information in which the players’ payoffs depend both on a privately observed type and an unknown but common “state of nature.” A monopolist data provider knows the state of nature and sells information to the players, thus solving a joint information and mechanism design problem: deciding which information to sell while eliciting the players’ types and collecting payments. We restrict ourselves to a general class of symmetric games with quadratic payoffs that includes games of both strategic substitutes (e.g., Cournot competition) and strategic complements (e.g., Bertrand competition, Keynesian beauty contest). The data seller designs a mechanism that truthfully elicits the players’ types and sends action recommendations that constitute a Bayes Correlated Equilibrium of the game. We fully characterize the class of all such Gaussian mechanisms—where the joint distribution of actions and private signals is a multivariate normal distribution—as well as the welfare- and revenue- optimal mechanisms within this class. For games of strategic complements, the optimal mechanisms maximally correlate the players’ actions, and conversely maximally anticorrelate them for games of strategic substitutes. In both cases, for sufficiently large uncertainty over the players’ types, the recommendations are deterministic (and linear) conditional on the state and the type reports, but they are not fully revealing.
Date:
23 May 2025, 14:15
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room G
Speaker:
Alessandro Bonatti (MIT Sloan School of Management)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Edward Valenzano
