Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. From now until the launch of Oxford Events, new events cannot be published or edited on OxTalks while all existing records are migrated to the new platform. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period.
From 16th, Oxford Events will launch on a new website: events.ox.ac.uk, and event submissions will resume. You will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
This paper adapts public good provision mechanisms to the environment where agents are motivated by reciprocity. In a two-agent economy, we show that the standard pivot mechanism is not strategy-proof if agents care strongly enough about each other’s intentions. Truthful reporting maximises a player’s own payoff and hence is viewed as selfish by his opponent, who retaliates by underreporting demand for the public good. Incentive compatibility is restored if the mechanism is implemented sequentially. When agents are asked to report their valuations in turn, a high report by the first mover may result in him paying an unfairly large share of the provision cost, should the second mover underreport her demand. Hence, truthful reporting is not judged as selfish by the second mover, who reciprocates by stating her true demand. Our results alert the institutional designer to the importance of game dynamics when agents are non-selfish.
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