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Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes
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A monopolist sells an object characterized by multiple attributes. A buyer can be one of many types, differing in their willingness to pay for each attribute. The seller can disclose to the buyer arbitrary attribute information in the form of a statistical experiment. The seller decides how to price the object, what information to provide, and how to price access to the information. To screen different types, the seller offers a menu of options that specify information prices, experiments, and object prices.
I characterize revenue-maximizing menus. If all types value the same attribute, then the seller cannot benefit from information disclosure and price discrimination. More generally, if each type values a single attribute and attributes are independent, then the seller can benefit from information disclosure but not from discriminatory pricing. In other cases, a discriminatory menu can be profitable; however, optimal experiments always belong to a tractable class of linear disclosure policies. The analysis informs the operation of various intermediaries including business brokers and online recruiting platforms.
Date:
2 November 2018, 14:00
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room A
Speaker:
Alexey Smolin (University of Bonn)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editors:
Erin Saunders,
Melis Clark
