OxTalks is Changing
OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
Out and Down: The Reputational Damage of Exiting International Organizations
Do states suffer reputational consequences when they exit international organizations (IOs)? And do the effects depend on whether states exit through voluntary withdrawal as opposed to forced suspension? We argue that states likely face negative reputational consequences for both types of IO exit because they are each equated with reneging on an international agreement. IO exit signals that the state may be more likely to back out of other international commitments: it stigmatizes the state as being a less reliable partner, and other actors in the international community are thus likely to downgrade that state’s reputation. Nevertheless, we expect that suspension generates stronger reputational damage than withdrawal because suspension indicates punishment by a peer group for misbehavior whereas withdrawal is not usually a rule violation, is self-selected, and managed. We test whether IO exit affects state reputation using novel data on all exits across 143 states and 534 IOs between 1984 and 2022. We measure state reputation using global market analysts’ perceptions of a state’s political risk; this captures states’ potential for following through on international commitments in an increasingly globalized world. Results indicate that both withdrawal and suspension are associated with reputational damage for the exiting state, though, as expected, suspension generates more reputational damage than withdrawal. As states use various strategies to contest IO rules, our results show an important way that IOs can enable decentralized enforcement mechanisms: global market analysts downgrade states for reneging on international commitments.
Date:
20 November 2025, 12:30
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room C
Speaker:
Professor Inken Von Borzyskowski (University of Oxford)
Organising department:
Department of Politics and International Relations (DPIR)
Organisers:
Professor Inken Von Borzyskowski (University of Oxford),
Prof Krzysztof Pelc (University of Oxford)
Organiser contact email address:
victoria.devars@politics.ox.ac.uk
Hosts:
Professor Inken Von Borzyskowski (University of Oxford),
Prof Krzysztof Pelc (University of Oxford)
Part of:
IR Research Colloquium
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editors:
Holly Omand,
Rebecca Freeman,
Nichola Anderson
