OxTalks is Changing
OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
Information in Tullock Contests
To reserve a time to meet with the speaker, please register at the following form:
docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Lg_zRsQyTbf_WXqsVrZyfuoPeHVxRp9Mt9oiF9iSSIQ/edit#gid=0
Abstract: We study Tullock contests in which the common value of the price is uncertain. We provide a simple framework in which general information structures can be easily described, and equilibrium can be easily characterized. This characterization allows us to obtain interesting results about how information influences players’ equilibrium efforts and payoffs. When the cost of effort exhibits sufficiently large (small) diseconomies of scale, in contests with symmetric information expected effort decreases (increases) as players become better informed, while in two-player contests with asymmetric information, a player with information advantage exerts less (more) effort, in expectation, than his opponent. In classic Tullock contests, when players have symmetric information the equilibrium expected effort and payoff are independent of the information available to the players. When information is asymmetric, a player’s information advantage is rewarded. Moreover, while in a two-player contest both players exert the same expected effort regardless of their information, expected effort is smaller when one player has information advantage than when both players have the same information; interestingly, a better informed player wins the prize less frequently.
Date:
1 December 2017, 14:15
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room A
Speaker:
Diego Moreno (University Carlos III Madrid)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editors:
Erin Saunders,
Anne Pouliquen
