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On 28th November OxTalks will move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events' (full details are available on the Staff Gateway).
There will be an OxTalks freeze beginning on Friday 14th November. This means you will need to publish any of your known events to OxTalks by then as there will be no facility to publish or edit events in that fortnight. During the freeze, all events will be migrated to the new Oxford Events site. It will still be possible to view events on OxTalks during this time.
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Optimal Information Hierarchies
The way in which information is organized within a group matters for how the transmission of that information can be implemented. With this in mind, we introduce the concept of information hierarchies as organizational forms of distributed knowledge: In an information hierarchy, agents are partitioned into groups such that all members of a group are equally informed, and more informed (in a strong sense) than all members of lower groups. Information hierarchies can be implemented by either select public meetings or by delegated information transmission. We show that, in a general class of problems involving network interactions with complementarities, there always exists an information hierarchy among the optimal information schemes. Therefore, although the environment might display no hierarchical structuring of agents (their influences and dependencies on the state and each other might be only partially ordered), optimal design treats them hierarchically with totally ordered information. Remarkably, information hierarchies are optimal in standard design (where the best equilibrium is selected) as well as in robust design (where the worst equilibrium is selected).
Please sign up for meetings here: docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1UnW-JOf7vD54h9QKWYWXQS1Wc-H4oP7nbywDdeJvr4o/edit#gid=0
Date:
22 November 2019, 14:15
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room A
Speaker:
Ina Taneva (University of Edinburgh)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Melis Clark
