Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. From now until the launch of Oxford Events, new events cannot be published or edited on OxTalks while all existing records are migrated to the new platform. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period.
From 16th, Oxford Events will launch on a new website: events.ox.ac.uk, and event submissions will resume. You will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
We use the analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel 2005) to study cheap talk from a sender who does not perfectly understand all the messages available to him. The sender is endowed with a privately known language competence corresponding to the set of messages he understands. For the messages he does not understand, the sender has correct but only coarse expectations about the equilibrium response of the receiver. An analogy-based expectation equilibrium is always a Bayesian solution and usually differs from an equilibrium with language barriers (Blume and Board 2013). Partial language competence rationalizes information transmission and lies in pure persuasion problems, and can facilitate information transmission from a moderately biased sender.
Please sign up for meetings here: docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Tf4YtDeDdmv3Dv379EyhWTL6lszs2Dy6yiff7yJeJAY/edit#gid=0
