On 28th November OxTalks will move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events' (full details are available on the Staff Gateway).
There will be an OxTalks freeze beginning on Friday 14th November. This means you will need to publish any of your known events to OxTalks by then as there will be no facility to publish or edit events in that fortnight. During the freeze, all events will be migrated to the new Oxford Events site. It will still be possible to view events on OxTalks during this time.
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We use the analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel 2005) to study cheap talk from a sender who does not perfectly understand all the messages available to him. The sender is endowed with a privately known language competence corresponding to the set of messages he understands. For the messages he does not understand, the sender has correct but only coarse expectations about the equilibrium response of the receiver. An analogy-based expectation equilibrium is always a Bayesian solution and usually differs from an equilibrium with language barriers (Blume and Board 2013). Partial language competence rationalizes information transmission and lies in pure persuasion problems, and can facilitate information transmission from a moderately biased sender.
Please sign up for meetings here: docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Tf4YtDeDdmv3Dv379EyhWTL6lszs2Dy6yiff7yJeJAY/edit#gid=0
