Information Acquisition and Use by Networked Players
In an asymmetric coordination (or anti-coordination) game, players acquire and use signals about a payoff-relevant fundamental from multiple costly information sources. Some sources have greater clarity than others, and generate signals that are more correlated and so more public. Players wish to take actions close to the fundamental but also close to (or far away from) others’ actions. This paper studies how asymmetries in the game, represented as the weights that link players to neighbours on a network, affect how they use and acquire information. Relatively centrally located players (in the sense of Bonacich, when applied to the dependence of players’ payoffs upon the actions of others) acquire fewer signals from relatively clear information sources; they acquire less information in total; and they place more emphasis on relatively public signals.

Details found here: www.davidronayne.net/lgn-seminar
Date: 29 January 2019, 12:45 (Tuesday, 3rd week, Hilary 2019)
Venue: Nuffield College, New Road OX1 1NF
Venue Details: Butler Room of D staircase
Speaker: David Myatt (London Business School)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Learning, Games and Network Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Melis Clark