Bounded Reasoning: Rationality or Cognition
Bounded reasoning about rationality can have important implications for behavior. These bounds are typically viewed as an artifact of limits in the ability to engage in interactive reasoning, i.e., to reason through “I think, you think, I think, etc …” However, in principle, these bounds need not be determined by limits in ability. This paper develops a novel identification strategy to show that bounded reasoning about rationality is not determined by limitations in ability. It goes on to show that non-degenerate beliefs about rationality can be an important determinant of behavior. This has important implications for out-of-sample predictions.
Date: 14 November 2017, 12:45 (Tuesday, 6th week, Michaelmas 2017)
Venue: Nuffield College, New Road OX1 1NF
Venue Details: Butler Room
Speaker: Willemien Kets (University of Oxford)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Economic Theory Workshop
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editors: Erin Saunders, Anne Pouliquen