Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. From now until the launch of Oxford Events, new events cannot be published or edited on OxTalks while all existing records are migrated to the new platform. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period.
From 16th, Oxford Events will launch on a new website: events.ox.ac.uk, and event submissions will resume. You will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
An important principle in common and criminal law is that a defendant is not liable for a harm if there is a ‘break in the chain of causation’ between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the harm. For example, if the negligence of a tanker company causes oil to leak onto the street, which is then set on fire by a opportunistic arsonist, the tanker company would not be liable for the fire damage, because the arsonist’s act ‘broke the chain of causation’ between the negligence and the damage (Watson v. Kentucky and Indiana Bridge and Ry Co.). This doctrine has been criticized, however, on the grounds that it’s difficult to make sense of it on mainstream philosophical accounts of causation. In this talk, I outline an alternative approach to causation and use it to explain what a ‘break in the chain of causation’ might amount to.
