On 28th November OxTalks will move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events' (full details are available on the Staff Gateway).
There will be an OxTalks freeze beginning on Friday 14th November. This means you will need to publish any of your known events to OxTalks by then as there will be no facility to publish or edit events in that fortnight. During the freeze, all events will be migrated to the new Oxford Events site. It will still be possible to view events on OxTalks during this time.
If you have any questions, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
We study the robust regulation of labour contracts in moral hazard problems. A firm offers a contract to incentivise production by an agent protected by limited liability. A regulator chooses the set of permissible contracts to (i) improve efficiency and (ii) protect the worker. The regulator ignores the agent’s productive actions and the firm’s costs and evaluates regulation by its worst-case regret. The regret-minimising regulation imposes a linear minimum wage, allowing all contracts above this linear threshold. The slope of the minimum contract balances the worker’s protection — by ensuring they receive a minimal share of the production — and the necessary flexibility for incentive provision.