OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
We study the robust regulation of labour contracts in moral hazard problems. A firm offers a contract to incentivise production by an agent protected by limited liability. A regulator chooses the set of permissible contracts to (i) improve efficiency and (ii) protect the worker. The regulator ignores the agent’s productive actions and the firm’s costs and evaluates regulation by its worst-case regret. The regret-minimising regulation imposes a linear minimum wage, allowing all contracts above this linear threshold. The slope of the minimum contract balances the worker’s protection — by ensuring they receive a minimal share of the production — and the necessary flexibility for incentive provision.
