Procedural Rationality in Repeated Games
Status: This talk is in preparation - details may change
Status: This talk has been cancelled
This paper considers finitely repeated games played by procedurally rational players, who sample their available alternatives and use realized payoffs as a basis for strategy selection. The corresponding solution concept is that of (payoff) sampling equilibrium, which is a distribution over strategies that is self-replicating under the sampling procedure. Sampling equilibria are rest points of a disequilibrium dynamic process, and stability with respect to this process can be used as an equilibrium selection criterion. The structure of stable sampling equilibria in symmetric, finitely repeated games is characterized, and illustrated with applications to cooperation and coordination over time.

Link to paper: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3468993

Please sign up for meetings here: docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1WTp83AxJaVGv6sMlwBer43q68i43dAe9BSeyb26ypa4/edit#gid=0
Date: 14 May 2021, 14:15 (Friday, 3rd week, Trinity 2021)
Venue: Held on Zoom
Speaker: Rajiv Sethi (Barnard College, Columbia University)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Melis Clark