OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
When faced with an issue, we often ask ourselves the question: How should we think about this issue? What beliefs or opinions we should have about it? One branch of epistemology – the theory of rational belief – studies the general principles that explain what the right answers to such questions are. But in order to articulate such principles, we need to know what the options are – that is, which sorts of beliefs or opinions are available. Traditionally, there are two models of belief or opinion that epistemologists have relied on here. On one model, the beliefs that you now have just consist of a body of propositions. On the second model, the beliefs that you now have consist of your subjective probability function. It will be argued here that neither of these models is fit for purpose. An alternative model of belief will be suggested to take their place.
