Oxford Events, the new replacement for OxTalks, will launch on 16th March. The two-week OxTalks freeze period starts on Monday 2nd March. During this time, there will be no facility to publish or edit events. The existing OxTalks site will remain available to view during this period. Once Oxford Events launches, you will need a Halo login to submit events. Full details are available on the Staff Gateway.
When faced with an issue, we often ask ourselves the question: How should we think about this issue? What beliefs or opinions we should have about it? One branch of epistemology – the theory of rational belief – studies the general principles that explain what the right answers to such questions are. But in order to articulate such principles, we need to know what the options are – that is, which sorts of beliefs or opinions are available. Traditionally, there are two models of belief or opinion that epistemologists have relied on here. On one model, the beliefs that you now have just consist of a body of propositions. On the second model, the beliefs that you now have consist of your subjective probability function. It will be argued here that neither of these models is fit for purpose. An alternative model of belief will be suggested to take their place.
