Scientific evidence shows that we are going through the first human-induced mass extinction, and as such, conservation policies are widely discussed among policymakers. However, there is little research on the harmful externalities of such policies. This paper combines global georeferenced data on wildlife habitats (including both animal and tree species) with information on armed conflict to estimate the violent externalities generated by international trade restrictions on wildlife products aimed at conserving biodiversity. An event-study specification shows that the imposition of trade restrictions increases the risk of conflict in affected areas. Two-stage least squares estimates for elephant ivory show that trade restrictions increase prices, which in turn increase the likelihood of conflict. Accounting for the spatial distribution of elephants, the implied effect size exceeds that of well-documented industrial conflict minerals. For precious trees, the analysis suggests that, once restrictions are in place, production shifts from states with high institutional capacity to those with low capacity, generating local windfall rents that fuel additional violence. Armed groups positioned to capture these rents expand operations into new areas and become more likely to gain territorial control, supporting the “feasibility” mechanism whereby increased wealth relaxes their budget constraints and enables violence. A social planner general equilibrium model shows that a targeted policy restricting trade in states with both high institutional capacity and relatively small stocks of precious trees improves welfare. Together, these findings document a previously overlooked conflict-related cost of conservation policy and suggest a mitigation strategy.