Abstract: According to (one version of) the Procreation Asymmetry, it is wrong to create people with bad lives, but we are not morally required to create people with good lives. While many philosophers are attracted to the Asymmetry, it has been notoriously difficult to formulate a plausible moral theory that incorporates and explains it. It has also seemed difficult to square the Asymmetry with standard views in population axiology, on which adding sufficiently happy people to the world is a good thing, not merely “neutral.” This talk is about a more fundamental problem: the Asymmetry is simply inconsistent with seemingly plausible principles about what we are morally permitted or required to do. The first aim of the talk is to formulate some of these puzzles, inspired by Parfit’s Mere Addition Paradox, using minimal assumptions. The second aim is to resolve them. I use the puzzles to motivate a view that incorporates the Procreation Asymmetry and which is not only consistent with the goodness of creating happy people, but which appeals to that goodness in resolving the puzzles.