The Political Economy of Immigration Enforcement: Conflict and Cooperation under Federalism
We study how local and federal responsibilities shape immigration enforcement outcomes. Tracking the movement of unlawfully present immigrants along the deportation pipeline, we propose a framework to decompose the variation in deportation rates between federal and local enforcement efforts, and the arrestee-pool composition. This allows us to recover local responses to changes in federal enforcement intensity, establishing that among urban counties, 80% exhibit strategic substitutabilities. Following a 2011 shift in federal enforcement priorities, local enforcement collaboration increased while alignment of local-federal preferences decreased. The federal level became very effective in directing its efforts toward counties where it expected higher collaboration.

Please sign up for meetings here: docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Ua4SH_A-6Niek7ORFzk-ZZkj1FdvWsHo0KLXArnca2Q/edit#gid=0
Date: 3 March 2020, 12:45
Venue: Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details: Seminar Room A
Speaker: Camilo Garcia-Jimeno (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Applied Microeconomics Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Melis Clark