OxTalks will soon move to the new Halo platform and will become 'Oxford Events.' There will be a need for an OxTalks freeze. This was previously planned for Friday 14th November – a new date will be shared as soon as it is available (full details will be available on the Staff Gateway).
In the meantime, the OxTalks site will remain active and events will continue to be published.
If staff have any questions about the Oxford Events launch, please contact halo@digital.ox.ac.uk
We introduce a solution concept for extensive-form games of incomplete information in which players need not assign likelihoods to what they do not know. This is embedded in a model in which players can hold a set of beliefs. Players make choices by looking for compromises that yield a good performance under each of their beliefs. Our solution concept is called perfect compromise equilibrium. It generalizes perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We show how it deals with uncertainty without using probabilities in Cournot and Bertrand markets, Spence’s job market signaling, as well as in bilateral trade with common value.
